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25 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NIE-60: Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1953

1. NIE-60 encountered no major substantive differences among the various agencies during its coordination. There were several slight differences in emphasis, but these appear to have been resolved and no dissents are anticipated.

2. It should be noted that the estimate has two important limitations of scope:

a. The estimate does not consider the effects of, or Communist reactions to, various possible US/UN courses of action which would have the effect of altering the present US military commitment. The Board felt, as stated in the footnote to paragraph 8 of the conclusions, that useful estimates along these lines could be made only if the NSC were to provide guidance as to which of the many possible courses of action were to be considered.

b. The estimate does not attempt to reach any conclusions as to the relationship of the Korean war to present Communist global strategy, or the importance of North Korea and the POW issue to Communist interests. The preliminary drafting included a discussion of these subjects, but since the issues involved many points which depended on judgment rather than demonstrable facts, the Board felt it necessary to exclude consideration of these issues so that a coordinated paper might be produced within the time allowed.

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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